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BY THOMAS W. FLEMING
REFLECTIONS ON POLITICS AND CAPITAL AMONG TEA PARTIERS
John – a late-50’s Tea Party leader and busi-ness owner in St Charles, Illinois – used this 
parable to illustrate the naturalness of capital-
ist exchange, the productive benefits of ‘free-
dom’. We sat together at lunch in downtown 
St Charles while he attempted to explain, with 
sometimes frustrating brevity, what the Tea Par-
ty was about. He and his consociates are pre-
dominantly small business owners concerned 
with the unfettered operation of free market 
principles and the individual’s right to engage 
in it and create capital, believing that only that 
political reality which best protects this right is 
the ideal one. For them, this reality is fast reced-
ing, being coopted by the ‘Left’ (variably called 
‘socialists’, ‘Marxists’, or ‘Communists’) who 
– either mistakenly or not – desire control at the 
expense of individual liberty. Our conversation 
was punctuated by exemplars of individuals 
and corporations who, when left to their de-
vices (‘unfettered’), reaped the benefits of their 
labour, but equally by the prognosis that ‘what’s 
going on’ is quite the opposite – that our rights 
to create capital are being abrogated. In what 
follows, I attempt a descriptive and theoretical 
overview of how we can approach such neolib-
eral political discourse, and argue (following 
Marx and Althusser) that how we understand 
politics in an anthropological sense turns on the 
self-referential, self-justifying logic of ideol-
ogy. 
Firstly, I will reflect on the sort of reality that 
John advocates. This end will be descriptive, 
but there is an important methodological and 
theoretical point to be made. I take as funda-
mental the notion that, following Benveniste, 
it is in and through language that we constitute 
ourselves as subjects, thereby establishing our 
subjectivity (1971: 224). I will not analyze Ben-
veniste’s claim, but rather presuppose that it is 
through our (intersubjective) interactions with 
one another that we constitute subjectivity and, 
crucially for our analysis, a subjunctive modal-
ity (i.e., the way things ought to be). Following 
Althusser (1977), I take as central the claim that 
subjectivity (the recognition that you and I are 
subjects) occurs within ideology. Likewise, it 
seems uncontroversial to claim that a subjunc-
tive modality necessary for conceptualizing po-
litical ends occurs within ideologies. Thus, we 
might say knowledge about ourselves, our rela-
tion to others and – further removed – how the 
world ought to be, is inherently recursive and 
reflexive. 
Secondly, an anthropological analysis of poli-
tics cannot rely on what I call the politics-qua-
process view, that is, the view that politics can 
be analyzed as sui generis functional institu-
tions that are somehow extrinsic to our inter-
actions and conceptualizations.  It seems to me 
that while ‘capitalism’ and the ‘free market’ are 
fundamental concepts of an ideal political real-
ity to Tea Partiers, how we study them should 
rest on the recognition that our subjectivity, be-
ing in ideology, is what renders any political re-
ality seemingly ‘natural’. 
The Tea Party is a self-professedly grass-roots 
political movement in the United States, that 
started in 2009. As such its constituent Tea Par-
ties vary in size, demographic composition, and 
in their organizational activities. While loosely 
organized, the Tea Parties consistently promote a 
triad of core principles: (1) fiscal responsibility, 
(2) constitutionally limited government, and (3) 
open markets. Many Tea Parties also promote 
what are deemed ‘social’ values like ‘traditional 
families’. Furthermore, there is a clear distinc-
tion between the ideal political reality and the 
unjust political reality, the just political reality 
JOHN:
THAT’S WHAT IT’S ALL ABOUT - IT’S ABOUT FREE 
TRADE.  IT’S ABOUT BUYIN’ AND SELLIN’ STUFF.  [...] 
AND WE DON’T WANT TO BE FETTERED.  IF I TELL 
YOU THAT THIS WATER IS THE BEST WATER IN ST. 
CHARLES AND IT’S GONNA COST YOU A BUCK A 
GLASS [...] AND ACROSS THE STREET THEY’RE GIVIN’ 
IT AWAY FREE ... YOU DIDN’T MIND PAYIN’ A DOLLAR 
A GLASS.  [I]T’S ALL ABOT KEEPIN’ GOVERNMENT 
OUT OF YOUR LIFE, BECAUSE PEOPLE, GIVEN FREE-
DOM, WILL BUY AND SELL AND CREATE COMMERCE. 
AND WHAT ELSE IS THERE, YOU KNOW?
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being protected by a just political system, such 
as that conceived by the Founding Fathers. A 
‘just’ political reality is one in which the eco-
nomic liberties of individuals and organizations 
of individuals within the free market are main-
tained. Contrarily, an unjust political reality is 
one in which individual liberties are abated by 
corruption, a disequilibrium in the function of 
the free market, the possibility of which pres-
ents a perpetual moral panic due to a perceived 
devolution into tyranny. 
John claims that he ‘joined’ the Tea Party at 
the age of 15 when he ‘decided to believe in the 
Constitution’. This is not hyperbolic because 
there is a sense in which he and others believe in 
continuity of their political orientations and tran-
scendent values.  Despite this ‘transcendence’, 
there is difficulty in talking about Tea Party ac-
tivists as a ‘group’ on the level of ethnographic 
fact-finding and anthropological analysis. On 
the ethnographic level, John, for one, asserts 
that it is a loose organization, a ‘confederation’ 
further subdivided by ‘confederations’. Indeed, 
the Tea Party is not a political party in the tradi-
tional sense. Put generally, it is a collection of 
‘civic organizations’ whose aim is to network 
and educate its membership, increasing its ranks 
with ‘informed voters’ so as to  influence the 
political system. The operation of these groups 
occurs on a local scale, and is usually managed 
by a few leaders. Meetings of the group occur 
normally once or twice a month, serving as in-
formational sessions where specialist speakers 
give talks on politically prescient issues. Other 
activities include poll watching, marching/can-
vassing for candidates, holding rallies, public 
events, and much more. 
Importantly, John rejected that the Tea Party 
is monolithic, instead asserting that its anti-
structure reveals people acting in their individ-
ual capacities as, above all, concerned citizens, 
‘people on the street’. This requires an anthropo-
logical definition of politics that broadly reflects 
the subjunctive character of political goals (of 
ideal states of affairs) rather than reflection of 
process, since it seems clear that ‘political ac-
tivism’ involves more than participation in po-
litical structures. In one possible definition, pol-
itics denotes an activity that is public rather than 
private, concerns public goals, and involves a 
differential of power among the individuals of 
the group in question (Swartz et al 2002: 105). 
Studying politics thus involves studying the 
‘processes involved in determining and imple-
menting public goals and in differential achieve-
ment and use of power by members of the group 
concerned with those goals’ (Swartz et al 2002: 
107). 
However, this definition fails to take into ac-
count the fact that an understanding of politics 
should not be simply processual, but effective. 
While the purpose of Tea Parties is partly to 
influence the ‘process’ of the political system 
through activism, their continued organization 
and operation owes much more to common 
concerns among like-minded citizens who are 
united by a concern for their liberties and the 
seeming rationality and commonsense of what 
they advocate. As such, I prefer a broader defi-
nition from Latour, where politics is defined as 
the progressive attainment of a common world 
(2010: 60). We might conceptualize the goal of 
Tea Party politics to be a reality constituted by 
free market principles, which best reflects the 
natural abilities and rights of individuals. 
Whatever we mean by any political activity, 
at least regarding Western societies, depends on 
the conceptual distinction between the ‘State’ 
and ‘civil society’. It is clear that the Tea Partiers 
make a distinction between (what is currently or 
potentially) a hegemonic, partied State and the 
heterogeneous ‘grassroots’ populace. But how 
do we make anthropological sense of this and 
what are the implications? As Marx observed, 
there is a presupposition that civil society is 
composed of ‘atoms’, ‘being[s] without rela-
tions, self sufficient’ (1963: 225), and it is of-
ten taken that the State in some way constrains 
these atoms that comprise civil society. Marx 
argued this was not the case – the State does not 
hold together ‘atoms’ of civil society, but rather 
the ‘atoms’ of civil society are the products of 
‘imagination’ (1963: 226). To think otherwise is 
due to the pretension that, as Chabal and Daloz 
observed, civil society has been seen in West-
ern society as largely outside of culture, the 
idea that democratization is necessarily derived 
from the ‘self-acquired power of civil society to 
check the hegemony of the State’ (2006: 219-
20). Indeed, while the vast assemblages of civil 
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society may be defined in contradistinction and 
by a self-consciousness of relative externality to 
the State (Bayart 1986: 117), any politico-sci-
entific study ought to take note of this histori-
cal particularity of the concept and its semiotic 
dimensions. 
Civil society and the State might be concep-
tually distinct from an emic perspective, but 
they cannot be taken as sui generis. They are 
embedded in the ‘social fabric’ and embody a 
particular manifestation of political account-
ability that is itself historically particular (Cha-
bal 1986: 12). Accountability, to John, rests on 
the assumption that ‘capitalism’ and the ‘free 
markets’ are fundamentally constitutive of in-
dividual liberty, and this influences and under-
writes the perceived goals of the Tea Parties. 
Such principles are coterminous with American 
values, John suggests: 
“Limited government, fiscal responsibility, free en-
terprise. […] Not managed enterprise – free enter-
prise.”
“So, why does [the Tea Party] adopt those principles 
and not others?”, I asked.
To which John responded: “Well, those are the prin-
ciples of the country. The business of the United 
States is business. That’s what the United States is 
all about.”
Accountability vis-a-vis protecting these rights 
is legitimized by historical or textual reference 
and by the self-referential nature of ideology. 
I will address the former now. It is oftentimes 
held as an ideal that ‘informed voters’ familiar-
ize themselves with historical and philosophical 
texts, including the works of the Founding Fa-
thers (the Federalist Papers), classical conserva-
tives (Edmund Burke), and a significant amount 
of history. Superlative value is placed on history 
and philosophy, since they claim that the pur-
pose of their organization is to educate and to 
propagate this information in such a way that it 
influences the way their members engage in the 
political system. For example, what is almost 
unconditionally appropriated by Tea Partiers is 
the Lockean notion that rights of appropriation 
are given in nature, elemental in a lex naturalis, 
and that this provides a basis for arguments for 
capitalism.  Political structures are only second-
ary (minimal in comparison) to a pre-existing, 
transcendent freedom of the individual to en-
gage in capitalist production. 
The logic underlying a Lockean conception of 
property is equally extensible to capital. Marx 
suggested that capital was historically opposed 
to landed property, and first took the form of 
money, and continues to take the form of money 
which is continually transformed into capital by 
‘definite processes’ (1909: 108). His descrip-
tions of these processes are concise and denote 
the exchanges by which a free market ought to 
function on the Tea Party view. The following 
schemas represent these ‘processes’, where ‘C’ 
denotes ‘commodity’, and ‘M’ denotes ‘mon-
ey’: 
1. C-M-C: selling in order to buy
2. M-C-M: buying in order to sell
 2.a M-C: a purchase
 2.b C-M: a sale
3. M-M: exchange of money for money – 
the consequence of the transformation, M-
C-M. 
 3.a M-M’: exchange of money for 
more money – the consequence of the trans-
formation, M-C-M’
4. M-C-M’: buying in order to sell dearer 
Whereas schema 1 represents ‘simple circula-
tion’, where the values attain a status ‘indepen-
dent of their use-values’ in the form of money 
(i.e., ‘M’) in the form of exchange values (Marx 
1909: 112), the last formula is ‘buying in order to 
sell, or, more accurately, buying in order to sell 
dearer.’ The latter represents the ‘general for-
mula of capital as it appears prima facie within 
the sphere of circulation’ (Ibid.: 113). If we sup-
pose for the moment that this represents how 
Tea Partiers conceptualize their engagement in 
a capitalist economy, the Lockean notion that 
individuals are disposed to property naturally, 
in acquiring it and in propagating it – such that 
it is an inalienable right – is presupposed in the 
right of individuals to engage in the ‘definite 
processes’ behind capitalist production.
I also mentioned the self-referential nature 
of ideology. I have moved purposefully from 
John’s description of what ‘freedom’ engenders 
to a more general analysis of familiar liberal 
The Unfamiliar 41
T
H
O
M
A
S W
. FLEM
IN
G
economic postulates. Describing the conditions 
of capitalist production is apt because Marx rec-
ognized that productive capacities, our material 
circumstances, engender ideology; indeed, con-
sciousness can never be ‘anything else but their 
actual life process’ and the ‘production of ideas’ 
is ‘at first directly interwoven with the material 
activity and the material intercourse’ of persons 
(1963: 89). Moreover, fundamental to ideology 
is the recognition that its supposed ‘practical 
role’, its logic, and ‘conditions of existence’ 
are accompanied by a belief in their supposed 
necessity (Althusser 1977: 230). That is to say, 
ideology is the lived relation between people 
and the world, and as such, the ‘naturalness’ 
of capitalism, or a particular political structure 
conducive to it, is sustained because it is sub-
jectively known. Describing and analyzing the 
beliefs of Tea Partiers cannot be done by taking 
capitalism or political systems as sui generis 
sets of laws – explicit symbolizations with ex-
plicit meaning – since, following Cohen (1985: 
309), boundaries enacted by ‘bounded’ groups 
often subsume ‘structures’ and perhaps even 
processes, and are integrated into intra-commu-
nal communication in reconstituting meaning. 
So, the meaning and social significance does 
not lie in the reality of the ‘free market’, but in 
symbolic statements, as Cohen notes, ‘designed 
to perpetuate the boundary’ of a community 
(1985: 309). Indeed, the ‘definite processes’ 
characteristic of capitalism are necessary for 
their ideal political reality, but this necessity 
cannot be based on points of continuity or dis-
continuity at the level of objectivity since this 
is not coterminous with a study of subjective 
speech acts, of propositions, of the mundane, 
that is, the purview of ethnographic description 
and anthropological analysis.  Here we should 
take Benveniste to heart and notice that lan-
guage is not simply a tool for communication 
but is the very condition of subjectivity, and it 
seems, by implication, to show that ideology 
(assuming it ‘interpellates’ subjectivity itself) is 
intrinsically intersubjective. 
John’s understanding of what the ‘free mar-
ket’ and ‘capitalism’ is and how this relates to 
his idea of a just political reality is inseparable 
from the idea of a ‘common world’, the sub-
junctive end that reflects his ontology. The point 
of this reflection, of course, is to notice that 
talking about ‘free markets’, ‘capitalism’ and 
‘economics’, generally, is problematic since 
what are prima facie objective entities must be 
taken constitutively as elements of an ideology 
which determines the limits of subjectivity, of 
possibility, and the seeming necessity of social 
(and political) forms. A proper anthropologi-
cal understanding of politics, however, yields a 
clearer picture of how they can be analyzed. uf
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